Dossier Bruselas scoop: European defence will not be ready by 2030 at the current pace.

Dossier Bruselas has obtained the full 27 pages of the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) first Annual Defence Readiness Report, a classified document intended solely for government use that provides a detailed assessment of Europe’s military capabilities, investment and defence industry. Reuters reported the main conclusions on 24 September on the basis of the report’s one-and-a-half-page executive summary. The full document now reveals the scale and location of Europe’s shortfalls.

Key findings:

• None of the nine major capability areas assessed is “on track” for 2030. Two are “not on track”, four are “at risk” and three are only “partially on track”.
• Europe plans to invest at least €452.3 billion between 2024 and 2029 in just seven of those areas, but money is not the only problem: there are shortages of stocks, integration, training, industrial capacity and support systems.
• The EU acknowledges a significant dependence on the United States for early warning, airborne electronic warfare, air-to-air refuelling and other “strategic enablers”. It warns that those gaps could widen rapidly if Washington reduces its contribution.
• Europe’s industrial capacity for air and missile defence is expected to grow by more than 800% between 2026 and 2030, with capacity for 155mm ammunition — NATO’s standard artillery calibre — rising by a similar amount. The drone ecosystem could expand by 140% between 2026 and 2027 alone. Even so, bottlenecks persist in raw materials, explosives, propellants, chips and components.
• The report calls for greater deep precision-strike capacity, stronger defence against ballistic missiles and drones, more ammunition, a secure European military cloud and less dependence on non-European suppliers of military artificial intelligence.

The European Union is spending on defence at levels not seen in four decades, its factories are ramping up production at a pace unprecedented since the Cold War, and governments have dozens of major military programmes under way. But when all that effort is measured against what Europe would need to be prepared for a high-intensity war by 2030, without US support or with only limited American support, the numbers do not add up.

That is the conclusion running through the 27 pages of the first Annual Defence Readiness Report, prepared by the EDA with contributions from the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the EU Military Staff.

Reuters published an initial report on 24 September based on the executive summary. It revealed the fundamental political conclusion: current national plans are insufficient to close existing gaps by 2030 in areas including air and missile defence, land combat, naval forces, ammunition and drones.

The full report develops that conclusion with investment figures, forecasts through 2029 and 2030, individual assessments of nine priority areas, an analysis of current industrial capacity and a series of recommendations. The EDA made the document available to ministers on 28 September, and EU leaders are due to discuss it at the European Council on 15 and 16 October.

Zero out of nine

The most revealing table appears on page 16. The EU classifies the nine Priority Capability Areas (PCAs) according to their prospects of meeting the targets set for 2030. The result: not a single one is progressing at the required pace.

“Strategic enablers” — air transport, command and control, space, early warning and refuelling — are “not on track”, as is air and missile defence. Land combat, maritime capabilities, missiles and ammunition, and the cluster covering cyber defence, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies are “at risk”. Artillery, drones and counter-drone systems, and military mobility are only “partially on track”.

“Not on track” means that the gaps are too large to be closed if current trends continue.

The report identifies where additional efforts need to be concentrated: air and missile defence, land combat, ammunition stocks, drones and counter-drone systems and, given a probable reduction or withdrawal of US capabilities, the most important strategic enablers.

A lot of money, badly spent

Money is not in short supply, but Europe needs to learn how to spend it better. The seven areas for which the document provides financial series account for approximately €452.3 billion in investment between 2024 and 2029. The largest block is land combat, at €122.2 billion. It is followed by maritime capabilities (€98.9 billion), missiles and ammunition (€68.1 billion), air and missile defence (€58.2 billion), strategic enablers (€49 billion), artillery (€37 billion) and drones and counter-drone systems (€18.9 billion).

Buy shares in the defence industry — seriously. Or do what I do and spend the money on a nice road bike. You will be poorer and happier.

The problem is not the amount of money but how it is spent: what is purchased, when it will be available, whether it can operate alongside other systems and whether there is a platform behind it that allows all that technology to be used in a prolonged war. The report warns that military readiness does not depend simply on the “number and sophistication of platforms”: integrated systems are needed, as are personnel trained to use them and the ability to sustain large formations over long periods.

The American gap

The biggest problem lies with the “strategic enablers”, the capabilities that make it possible to locate the enemy, direct operations, transport forces over long distances and keep them fighting once they get there. Most of the €49 billion Europe will invest in these capabilities between 2024 and 2029 is going into C4ISTAR — command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.

By contrast, there has been barely any recent investment in air-to-air refuelling aircraft or airborne early-warning and electronic-warfare aircraft. The report warns that these shortfalls will increase in the short term because of the withdrawal of US military assets from Europe, and recommends urgent investment in air-to-air refuelling, strategic transport, strategic command and control, situational awareness, early warning and space surveillance.

Air defence: plenty of purchases, too many from outside Europe

The second sector that the report places off track for 2030 is one of the most sensitive since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Planned investments between 2024 and 2029 amount to €58.2 billion, but Europe still lacks medium- and long-range ground-based systems, ballistic-missile defence and early-warning capabilities.

New threats are also emerging, including drone swarms and hypersonic missiles. Europe is buying quickly, but much of what it is purchasing is non-European and procurement is not focused on essential systems such as ballistic-missile defence.

Artillery: not enough capacity to strike deep

Europe is rapidly rebuilding its conventional artillery, but it retains a different kind of gap: the ability to hit targets far behind the front line. The EU estimates that up to €37 billion will be spent in this area between 2024 and 2029 and yet “Europe has a significant shortfall in long-range strike capability”. The deficiency concerns, above all, conventional ground-launched missiles.

There are also gaps throughout the entire “kill chain”: connecting sensors to weapons, common doctrine, and targeting procedures. Two-thirds of Member States are investing in artillery and much of the equipment should be delivered before 2030, but efforts on anti-tank systems and deep precision strike are “modest”.

The report concludes that Europeans remain “highly dependent on non-European solutions”, which will limit their ability to scale up production during a crisis.

Ammunition: €68.1 billion and still not enough

A conventional war consumes enormous quantities of ammunition; Ukraine provides ample evidence of that. Europe has deficits “across all categories of ammunition and missiles”. Between 2024 and 2029, €68.1 billion in spending is planned, primarily on missiles — including air-defence and cruise missiles — as well as artillery and anti-aircraft ammunition.

But projections for 2030 still point to shortfalls in “battle-decisive ammunition”.

And simply putting money on the table and ordering shells is not enough. Production must be expanded in industries with complex supply chains, while ensuring the availability of raw materials, energy, propellants and other specialised components, many of which are imported.

Drones: the fastest transformation

Drones are undergoing the fastest transformation of all. Europe already has more than 200 companies manufacturing drones or counter-drone technology: a dynamic but fragmented ecosystem, the report warns.

Investment has increased sixfold, but only one-third of the programmes currently under development will be delivered before 2030. There are shortages of multifunction tactical drones, FPV drones, long-endurance systems, unmanned combat aircraft and counter-drone systems.

Here, the problem is neither a lack of investment nor poorly chosen priorities, but slow procurement procedures and technology evolving so quickly that there remains “a risk that capabilities will be obsolete before they are delivered”.

Industry: +800%

The industrial figures are another of the document’s major revelations. The European Commission estimates that air and missile defence production capacity will increase by more than 800% between 2026 and 2030, while capacity for 155mm ammunition will rise by a similar amount. For drones and counter-drone systems, the estimated increase is 140% in just two years, between 2026 and 2027.

The problem lies not in assembling ammunition but much further upstream. There are shortages of raw materials, permanent magnets, chips and semiconductors, chemical precursors, printed circuit boards, FPGAs and specialised software-development capacity.

Europe has increased its ammunition manufacturing capacity sevenfold since 2022, but inputs such as nitrocellulose remain in short supply. The report calls for supply chains to be monitored and preventive measures to be taken when necessary.

Demand also needs to be consolidated. Companies need long-term contracts to justify multibillion-euro investments in new production lines, but European demand remains fragmented and that, the report says, prevents economies of scale from being fully exploited.

Converting civilian industry to military production

The report proposes using civilian factories to accelerate rearmament and estimates that Europe has €614 billion in idle industrial capacity that could potentially be redirected towards the defence industry.

Doing so would require retraining workers from sectors such as the automotive industry and adapting civilian production lines, a complex process requiring specialised facilities and security infrastructure.

A European military cloud

The shortcomings go beyond steel. The assessment of cyber defence, electronic warfare, AI and quantum technologies is classified as “at risk” because of fragmented national approaches, uneven interoperability standards, shortages of specialised personnel, external technological dependence and the “absence of a secure European military cloud”.

The report also warns of an “overdependence on non-European providers of artificial intelligence applications for defence” — in practice, US suppliers.

Not enough investment in military R&D

The technological problem is structural. According to the report, the EU and its Member States spend one-tenth as much on military R&D as the United States.

Europe also struggles to turn research into operational systems, while acquisition cycles are too long for technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, advanced sensors, quantum technologies and space capabilities.

Plenty of prototypes, not enough new weapons actually entering service.

Blind in space

The assessment of space capabilities is harsh. Investment is concentrated in only a handful of countries and is focused primarily on communications, surveillance, observation and space situational awareness.

Only a small number of programmes will begin delivering before 2030. Specifically military space capabilities — constellations, ground stations, infrastructure and launchers — are “comparatively underdeveloped”.

At sea: ships, yes; almost everything else, not so much

Governments will spend €98.9 billion between 2024 and 2029 on military maritime capabilities. Many frigates and corvettes will not enter service until after 2030, minehunters barely feature in current plans, and there are shortfalls in naval ammunition, missiles, integrated air and missile defence, long-range strike and the protection of subsea infrastructure.

Strategic sea transport also remains partly dependent on private commercial operators.

The report calls for investment to be concentrated on large platforms with naval strike capabilities and for more resources to be devoted to replenishment at sea, seabed protection and maritime domain awareness.

Defence spending surges

According to the report, the EU-27 spent €418 billion on defence in 2025, equivalent to 2.2% of EU GDP, and that figure will rise to €547 billion in 2029.

The defence industry employs 532,000 workers and its economic contribution is estimated at €149.4 billion in 2024 and €162.46 billion in 2025.

And, with Keynes lurking in the background, reaching NATO’s new 5.0% spending target could increase EU GDP by 0.8% by 2035.

Ukraine is already part of Europe’s rearmament

Since February 2022, the EU and its Member States have provided €77 billion in military assistance, trained 95,000 Ukrainian soldiers and supplied more than 2.5 million artillery shells.

Another €60 billion will come in 2026 and 2027 through the Ukraine Support Loan.

The report argues that European support has evolved from emergency assistance into a “strategic investment in defence readiness” and that the EU is now the largest foreign public investor in Ukraine’s defence industry.

Money is no longer the problem

Reading the full report makes one thing clear: by the end of 2026, the problem is no longer that Europe is spending too little. The problem is that all that money is still not producing a coherent force capable of allowing the EU to defend itself collectively and sustain operations over a prolonged period.

The document is littered with references to fragmentation, lack of interoperability, insufficient stocks, external dependencies and vulnerable supply chains.

There is a shortage of personnel — and of personnel who are properly trained.

And it warns that no Member State will be ready if it tries to do it alone.

ps: translated with an AI tool

Idafe Martín

editor